The Meloni–Magyar Meeting May Mark a New Phase in Hungarian–Italian Relations

Giorgia Meloni’s decision to receive Hungary’s prime minister-elect, Péter Magyar, in Rome before the formal transfer of power in Budapest was more than a routine diplomatic courtesy. It signaled that Italy is already treating the incoming Hungarian government as a political reality worth engaging early. The meeting at Palazzo Chigi reportedly focused on migration, defense and economic cooperation, which suggests that both sides wanted to move quickly from symbolism to substance.

What makes the encounter especially interesting is that Hungary and Italy now sit in a familiar but slightly altered relationship. They are not natural twins in Europe, but neither are they strangers. They share certain instincts — on migration, on the need for stronger national room for maneuver inside the EU, and on the idea that influence in Brussels is best pursued from within rather than from the margins. At the same time, there are limits to the overlap. Meloni has remained firmly aligned with the Western line on Ukraine, while Magyar, though clearly more pro-European and more Atlanticist than his predecessor, is expected to handle Russia and Ukraine with greater caution. That gives the relationship its shape: real common ground, but not ideological sameness.

A relationship that has usually been steady rather than dramatic

Since the democratic transition, Hungarian–Italian relations have generally been stable, pragmatic and low-conflict. Italy was one of the Western European states that mattered to Hungary’s post-communist reorientation, and the relationship was anchored early in the wider framework of Euro-Atlantic integration. It was not usually the most visible bilateral axis in Europe, but it was a reliable one.

That changed at certain moments, usually when strong political personalities gave the relationship a more recognizable face. Under Silvio Berlusconi, ties between Rome and Budapest gained a distinctly political dimension. Berlusconi and Viktor Orbán belonged to the same broad European center-right world, and their repeated contacts made the bilateral connection easier to read as part of a wider ideological map. The relationship did not begin with them, but under Berlusconi it acquired a clearer political profile.

From Berlusconi to Meloni

Later, the Hungarian–Italian relationship moved into another visible phase during the migration crisis. Orbán’s 2018 meeting with Matteo Salvini in Milan gave the connection a sharper, more confrontational European meaning. Migration became the most obvious point of overlap, and the bilateral relationship began to look less like a matter of routine diplomacy and more like a small axis within a changing European right.

That logic deepened again under Giorgia Meloni. Her visit to Budapest in 2023 and Orbán’s trip to Rome in 2024 showed how strongly migration, demography, competitiveness and sovereignty had become the central vocabulary of the relationship. Those meetings did not create Hungarian–Italian ties from scratch, but they made visible a political closeness that had been building for some time.

This longer arc matters because the Meloni–Magyar meeting does not appear in a vacuum. It comes at the end of a post-1989 relationship that has mostly been durable and businesslike, but has occasionally become politically charged when the right constellation of leaders emerged. What is new now is not the existence of dialogue between Rome and Budapest, but the context in which that dialogue is being resumed. This time, Italy is not dealing with a Hungarian government defined by permanent confrontation with Brussels, but with one that seems to want a reset without abandoning every hard edge of the previous era’s language.

Where the two sides naturally align

That may be exactly why Meloni was interested in meeting Magyar so early. She is one of the few major European leaders who combines institutional legitimacy with a politics that still speaks the language of sovereignty, borders and national interest. Magyar, for his part, is trying to present himself as both the restorer of Hungary’s Western credibility and the head of a government that will not simply dissolve into soft European centrism. The two leaders do not represent the same politics, but they clearly understand each other’s terrain.

The common ground is easiest to see on migration. Under Meloni, Italy has pushed for stricter border protection and a harder line on irregular arrivals. Magyar has also signaled that Hungary’s migration policy will remain strict under his government. The tone may differ, but the underlying view is similar: migration is not simply a humanitarian or administrative issue, but a question of sovereignty, border control and political legitimacy. That alone creates an immediate area of functional overlap between Rome and Budapest.

A second point of contact lies in their broader EU approach. Neither leader is building a politics of withdrawal. Meloni has tried to maximize Italy’s leverage from inside the Union, not by stepping outside it. Magyar appears to be pursuing something comparable for Hungary: repairing relations with Brussels, unfreezing funds and rebuilding trust, while still insisting on a more assertive national posture than the one traditionally associated with liberal Europeanism. That makes the relationship between them more interesting than a simple ideological match. It is not about belonging to the same camp. It is about speaking a partially shared European language from different political biographies.

Where the limits remain

The main limit, however, is obvious. Ukraine remains the area where similarity gives way to difference. Meloni has been one of the clearest pro-Ukraine voices on the European right. Magyar is expected to move Hungary closer to the Western mainstream than Orbán did, but not necessarily all the way to the Italian position. That gap matters, because foreign policy in Europe is now increasingly shaped by the war. It means that Hungarian–Italian cooperation, however warm, will still have a boundary line.

Why the Rome meeting matters

This is why the meeting in Rome carries more weight than an ordinary first handshake. It may turn out to be only an opening contact, but it also has the feel of political calibration. Italy is testing what kind of Hungary is now arriving. Hungary is testing how to re-enter serious European conversation without sounding anonymous.

Since 1989, Hungarian–Italian relations have often been solid without being central. This time they may become more than that: a useful channel between an incoming Central European government seeking credibility and a Southern European leader who understands how to combine institutional power with political edge. If that happens, the meeting in Rome will look less like a courtesy call and more like the beginning of a new bilateral balance.

Illustration: AI-generated image