A New Political Era Begins in Hungary on May 9

On May 9, a new political era will begin in Hungary. That is when the newly elected National Assembly will convene, with Tisza starting the term with a two-thirds majority and Fidesz–KDNP entering the cycle as a much smaller opposition force.

The change is not merely about parliamentary numbers: for the first time since 2010, Fidesz will find itself in a genuine opposition role, while Péter Magyar is promising not simply a change of government, but a transformation of the power system built by Fidesz.

Fidesz forms its new parliamentary group

Fidesz’s new parliamentary group has been formed with 44 MPs, while KDNP will establish a separate group of 8 representatives. This will be Fidesz’s first opposition parliamentary team since 2010.

The smaller group means not only fewer MPs, but also fewer parliamentary positions, a narrower room for manoeuvre, less state funding and reduced political influence. The party now has to find its new role without holding government power, becoming instead its monitor and critic.

Viktor Orbán shifts terrain

The Fidesz leader will not take up his parliamentary mandate, but this does not mean a withdrawal from politics. He has named the “reorganisation of the national side” as his main task and intends to continue leading Fidesz as party chairman.

This looks more like a shift of terrain: Orbán may play his role not in parliamentary debates, but in reorganising his political camp, redefining Fidesz’s identity and strengthening the party’s background structures.

For the outgoing government, this is also a forced situation. The party has lost its parliamentary majority, its government resources and its former control over the political agenda. It now has to decide whether to continue as a conventional opposition party or instead build a movement-based, media-driven and social resistance against Tisza’s two-thirds majority.

Péter Magyar targets the key positions of the NER

Péter Magyar quickly identified the first zone of conflict: the key institutions of the NER, Hungary’s System of National Cooperation. He has called on the heads of several state and constitutional institutions to resign, including leaders of bodies linked to the judiciary, the prosecution service, the media system, competition oversight and state auditing.

The political message is clear: according to the future prime minister, these institutions did not function as independent checks and balances, but as pillars of Fidesz’s power system.

Legally, however, the situation is more complicated. The mandates of many of the officials concerned do not automatically end with an electoral defeat, as several offices are protected and their terms extend across full government cycles. Therefore, Tisza will need not only political will, but also legally defensible procedures if it wants to carry out personnel changes.

This may become one of the first major conflicts of the new parliamentary term: how far does the mandate of a two-thirds election victory extend, and where do constitutional limits begin?

Accountability and asset recovery

One of Tisza’s strongest promises is accountability. Péter Magyar and his party would join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, open the files of former state security agents, reform the prosecution system and establish an asset recovery mechanism.

This directly affects one of the most sensitive areas of the Fidesz era: EU funds, state investments, public procurement and the economic networks linked to politics.

The task, however, will be difficult. Tisza voters expect quick results, but accountability can only remain credible in the long term if it takes place within the framework of the rule of law. The greatest challenge will be ensuring that the process is seen not as political revenge, but as accountability based on provable cases.

The media could become one of the main battlefields

One of the foundations of Fidesz’s power was the media system, and Péter Magyar’s party also wants to transform this. They would end the financing of state propaganda, place public media on new foundations and reform the media authority system.

The question is how this can be carried out without it becoming a simple transfer of power, and instead leading to a genuinely more independent and transparent public service media system.

A new constitution and term limits

Tisza would abolish the Sovereignty Protection Office, prepare a new constitution and introduce term limits for the prime minister. Under this proposal, a person could serve as head of government for no more than two terms, or eight years.

This has a clear political purpose: to limit the possibility of Viktor Orbán’s return. Legally, however, it could provoke debate, especially if the rule were applied retroactively.

Making secret decisions public

Péter Magyar also promises to make public the Orbán government’s secret contracts, government resolutions and cabinet meeting records.

This could have serious political consequences: if the documents contain incriminating material, they could lead to parliamentary inquiry committees, criminal proceedings and further scandals. If, however, the disclosures appear selective, that could weaken Tisza’s credibility.

This will not be a simple change of government

The stakes of the coming months are far greater than who takes their seat in parliament. Tisza does not only want to govern; it wants to intervene in the core institutions of the Fidesz era. Fidesz, meanwhile, is trying to survive one of the most severe defeats in its history while no longer controlling the state.

That is why May 9 will mark more than the formation of a new National Assembly. It will mark the beginning of a new political era, in which the central question will be: what remains of the system built after 2010, and what will Fidesz be capable of in opposition?

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